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This paper assesses the effect on total factor productivity (TFP) of a change in the status of a 
firm from domestic producer to either exporter or subsidiary of a multinational firm. It is an 
extension of earlier work that looks solely on the effect of exporting on TFP (Girma et al, 2003 
and 2004 and Wagner, 2002). In particular, it estimates the differences in TFP between 
domestic, exporting firms or subsidiaries of multinationals after controlling for the likely 
presence of endogeneity using the Multiple Treatment Approach (Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2000 and Lechner, 2001). Results show that firms that have become exporters experience 
higher TFP, between 7.8% and 8.8%, with respect to domestic producers. Productivity gains 
were also experienced for firms acquired by multinationals relative to domestic producers 
ranging from 11.5% to 13%. Finally, exporters have a lower annual TFP compared to firms 
acquired by multinationals by around 10 percentage points. 
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Increasing international trade and the emergence of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are two of the most 
significant phenomena the UK economy has experienced the last twenty years. These changes have 
affected the UK economy in various ways. This paper focuses on the question whether the decision of a 
British firm to become an exporter or the acquisition of a British firm by a multinational company affects its 
productivity. Following on the recent theoretical literature on exports versus FDI and productivity and the 
empirical research on the causal effect of exporting on productivity, I try to assess the causal effect of 
exporting decision or acquisition by MNEs on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of British firms. 
For that reason, I extend the single treatment approach followed by Girma etal (2003, 2004) and Wagner 
(2002), allowing for an additional treatment. This additional treatment is the possible outcome that a local 
firm is acquired by a multinational. 
The dataset used includes information on an unbalanced panel of more than 14,113 British firms in the 
manufacturing sector for the period from 1990 to 1996. Firms are divided into three types: pure domestic 
(non-exporters), exporters and firms acquired by domestic and foreign multinationals. There are between 
2,441 and 3,137 firms each year and all of them are observed at least for two consecutive years.  
Using a multiple treatments approach based on the literature on evaluation methods, Blundel and Costa 
Dias (2000), I try to assess the following causal effects on TFP growth for British firms: i) becoming an 
exporter relative to remaining a domestic producer, ii) being acquired by an MNE relative to remaining 
domestic producer and iii) becoming an exporter relative to being acquired by an MNE.  
The results show that the short-term TFP gains for exporters relative to domestic producers are between 
7.79% and 8.79% depending on the number of matches allowed and are all significant at a 5 % level of 
significance. Identical in sign and again statistically significant at a 5% level, but higher in magnitude are 
the gains experienced by subsidiaries of multinationals relative to domestic producers, one year after the 
acquisition. On average firms that were acquired by MNEs had a higher annual productivity growth 
between 11.55% and 13.09% relative to domestic producers. Finally, the difference in TFP growth, one 
year after the change in status, between exporters and firms that were acquired by MNEs was negative 
for almost all the number of matches. Only one was significant at the 6% level with a value of 9.94%. The 
rest of the estimates were ranging between 8.58% and 9.49% less productivity for exporters, but only 




During the last two decades UK has become one of the most globally integrated economies
in the world. There are many aspects of this phenomenon in the UK economy, but two can
be considered as the most important. The ￿rst is the rapid expansion of UK￿ s international
trade with other countries1. While the second is the growing activities and importance of
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) within UK and in particular the increase of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI)2. The e⁄ects of increased trade and FDI have raised numerous
discussions among the public and the academic community with regard to the bene￿ts and
losses for national economies. In this paper the discussion will focus on the UK economy
and the question whether the decision of a British ￿rm to become an exporter or the
acquisition of a British ￿rm by a multinational company a⁄ects its productivity.
There is already a vast literature that tries to assess the exporting decision versus
productivity question, see for example Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and
Jensen (1999) and Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004). The main question that is
addressed in this body of literature is whether the decision of a ￿rm to export leads to
better performance. In particular there are two main hypotheses under investigation: i)
the learning by exporting (LBE) hypothesis and ii) the self selection hypothesis. The
￿rst suggests that when a ￿rm enters the export market becomes more productive due
to higher competition and by accumulating knowledge from a potentially more advanced
market. While, the second claims that future exporters experience an increase in their
productivity some time before exporting takes place, since they have to be able to cover
sunk costs in order to enter the foreign market.
From an econometric point of view, it is clear that there is a problem of causality.
Do exporters become more productive or is it that more productive ￿rms enter foreign
markets? Many di⁄erent approaches have been implemented in order to tackle the causal-
ity problem and di⁄erent results were obtained. For example, Clerides etal (1998) used
full information maximum likelihood and generalised method of moments estimators on a
panel of Colombian, Mexican and Moroccan ￿rms and found that there is no learning by
exporting3 and that exporters self select. Similar results were obtained by Bernard and
Jensen (1999) on a much larger unbalanced panel of US plants, but without looking for
causal e⁄ects. On the other hand, Girma etal (2004) implemented a di⁄erence in di⁄erence
approach in an unbalanced panel of matched UK ￿rms and found that both self selection
12.64% annual increase for total trade in constant prices for the period 1960-2003 (OECD, Historical
International Trade by Commodities, 1961-1990, 1991-2003.)
2$28 billion of inward FDI in￿ ow on average per year over the period 1981-2004 (OECD, International
Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2005).
3with the exception of Morocan ￿rms.
1and learning by exporting exist.
Similar to the literature on the decision to export and productivity, the research on
the topic of the theory of FDI is voluminous and dates back at least three decades4.
One of the ￿rst attempts was by Dunning (1977, 1981)5, who stated that a multinational
￿rm should be superior to local ￿rms in order to enter the domestic market due to costs
of entry. Dunning speci￿ed this superiority in three advantages a multinational should
posses in order to be able to undertake FDI. These are: i) an ownership advantage, ii) a
location advantage and iii) an internalisation advantage. The ownership advantage refers
to exclusive product or production practices like patents or R&D. The location advantage
is related to trade restrictions, such as tari⁄s and quotas, transportation cost and lower
labour cost at the host country. The internalisation advantage refers to the fact that ￿rm
speci￿c practices and technologies are better transferred within the same company rather
than by licensing6. Hence, the ability of the MNE to transfer its advanced technology to
its subsidiary could lead to better performance in terms of total factor productivity for the
newly acquired ￿rm.
Recently, a new stream of the literature has tried to integrate the two existing theo-
retical frameworks discussed above by formulating a model where a ￿rm can choose the
mode of entry in a foreign market, either by exporting or undertaking FDI and the im-
portance of ￿rm productivity di⁄erences. Helpman etal (2004) construct a model in which
￿rms can serve a market abroad by exporting or horizontal FDI, similar to the proximity-
concentration literature (see Krugman, 1983, Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Brainard,
1993, and Markusen and Venables, 2000), that allows for ￿rm heterogeneity in productiv-
ity. Firms choose to undertake FDI, if trade costs are higher than the cost of acquiring or
building and maintaining a plant abroad. Helpman etal show that there is a clear partition
of ￿rms with respect to their productivity and the mode of serving a foreign market. The
most productive ￿rms will engage into FDI, while the next most productive ￿rms will ex-
port and the least productive ￿rms will just sell in the domestic market. This result seems
to be consistent with empirical evidence in the case of UK (Girma etal, 2005) and for the
case of Japan (Head and Ries, 2003).
In this paper, following on the recent theoretical literature on exports versus FDI and
productivity and the empirical research on the causal e⁄ect of exporting on productivity,
I try to assess the causal e⁄ect of exporting decision or acquisition by MNEs on the Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of British ￿rms for the period 1990-1996. For that
4for early studies see Kindleberger (1969) and Hymer (1976).
5see Markusen 1995 for a summary.
6For a discussion on internalisation see Williamson, 1975 and 1981, Teece, 1977, Mans￿eld and Romeo,
1980, and Rugman, 1986
2reason, I extend the single treatment approach followed by Girma etal (2004) and Wagner
(2002), allowing for an additional treatment. This additional treatment is the possible
outcome that a local ￿rm is acquired by a multinational. More speci￿cally, using a multiple
treatments approach based on the literature on evaluation methods, Blundel and Costa
Dias (2000), Frolich (2002), Lechner (2001) and (2002) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano
(2003), I will try to assess the following causal e⁄ects on TFP for British ￿rms for the
period 1990-1996 : i) becoming an exporter relative to remaining a domestic producer, ii)
being acquired by an MNE relative to remaining domestic producer and iii) becoming an
exporter relative to being acquired by an MNE.
I ￿nd that British exporters are more productive than British ￿rms selling only domes-
tically. Exporters appear to be more productive relative to domestic producers by 7.79%
to 8.79% one year after they became exporters. This ￿nding is similar with the results
obtained in other studies, see for example Girma etal (2004) for the UK, Alvarez and Lopez
(2005) for Chile and Wagner (2002) for Germany. I also ￿nd that British ￿rms acquired
by MNEs experience higher TFP growth one year after acquisition than domestic sellers.
They gain between eleven to thirteen percentage points more TFP when compared with do-
mestic producers. This result is similar in terms of sign and magnitude as the one obtained
in Conyon et al (2002) with the solely di⁄erence that they look on labour productivity for
British ￿rms. Girma and Gorg (2007) also found a positive causal e⁄ect, but very small
in magnitude in their work for two sectors in British manufacturing. While Harris and
Robinson (2002) found that British subsidiaries experience lower TFP growth relative to
domestic producers a year after acquisition. Finally, there is evidence that British exporters
are less productive when compared to British ￿rms acquired by MNEs. New British ex-
porters have a smaller productivity growth of 8.6 to 9.95 percent one year after they begin
to export. This result seems to be in agreement with the argument of Dunning (1977) that
MNEs have a superior technology and are able to transfer it to their subsidiaries.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I brie￿ y discuss a simple
theoretical framework as a way to motivate the empirical question. Sections 3 and 4
describe econometric issues that arise because of the simultaneity problem and the three
causal e⁄ects that can be estimated. The control for confounding approach that is used
and the necessary conditions in order to identify the counterfactual are discussed in Section
5. While Section 6 describes the advantages of pair-matching on the propensity score
estimator that is implemented to get the causal e⁄ect for the following three cases; a)
exporting vs domestic production, b) exporting vs becoming subsidiary of MNEs and c)
being acquired by MNEs vs domestic producers. In addition, it discusses the extensions
of the propensity score matching estimator that permit for bias correction when not exact
3matching is present and allow heteroscedastic variances for treatments. Section 7 o⁄ers
a detailed description of the original data and the steps followed to construct the ￿nal
sample. In Section 8, I present and discuss the results for the Multinomial Logit and the
three Average Treatment E⁄ect for the Treated estimates obtained when the condition of
Common Support is imposed and for the whole sample, respectively. Furthermore, the
validity of the Irrelevant Independence Alternatives assumption and the Common Support
condition are tested and discussed. Finally, Section 9 o⁄ers a detailed conclusion of the
results and discuss their implications.
2 Theoretical Background
A theoretical framework similar to the type of proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ model is
needed in order to describe the setup of my research question. In particular, I assume
that ￿rms operate within a dynamic monopolistic competition environment, are initially
producing and selling only into the domestic market and then have the possibility to
choose between three di⁄erent alternative states. They can decide to: i) remain domestic
producers, ii) become exporters or iii) become subsidiaries of MNEs. The di⁄erence of
this setup with other theoretical models, like Helpman etal (2004), lays on the fact that I
look at the case where a ￿rm is the recipient of FDI rather than being the investor. As
in all similar models there are bene￿ts and costs related to the three decisions of the ￿rm.
A pro￿t maximising ￿rm will choose one of the three alternatives, only if its current and
future discounted revenues from such a choice are higher than the cost.
First, consider the decision of a ￿rm to export compared to a situation where it sells
only at home. The cost of such a decision consists mainly of trade restrictions (tari⁄s),
transportation cost and sunk costs of exporting (product alteration). While the revenues
arise from increased sales or the presence of economies of scale. Hence, a ￿rm will decide to
export if the expected discounted gains from exporting are greater than the cost of entry
into the foreign market, as in the model of Roberts and Tybout (1997).
Second, a ￿rm faces the choice to accept the o⁄er of a MNE to become its subsidiary
relative to remaining a domestic producer. The gains associated with such a decision are
mainly ￿nancial and more speci￿cally the amount o⁄ered by the MNE for the acquisition.
While the cost is the loss of ownership and is related to the market value of ￿rm plus
the present value of any future revenues. In addition assume that the domestic ￿rm faces
uncertainty in the market that operates, which a⁄ects its future pro￿ts. Hence, the local
￿rm will choose to become a subsidiary of a multinational if the monetary reward is higher
4than its present market value and future pro￿ts (adjusted for uncertainty)7. Similarly, the
decision of the domestic ￿rm between exporting and being a subsidiary of a MNE will
depend on the net gains from exporting compared to the net gains of becoming a¢ liated
to a multinational. If the former is higher than the latter then the ￿rm decides to export
and vice versa.
In an environment like this, an increase in the ￿xed cost of exporting will lead to
a situation in which there are less exporters and more of domestic producers and ￿rms
acquired by MNEs. While a fall in uncertainty will result in less companies to be acquired
by MNEs and more companies exporting and selling domestically. This is a rather simple
theoretical background, it is de￿nitely not a model and its main purpose is to motivate the
empirical question and discussion.
3 Econometric Issues
The research question of this paper tries to assess the e⁄ect of a change in the status of
British ￿rms on their total factor productivity growth. In particular, the focus lays on
the estimation of the causal di⁄erences on the TFP growth for a British ￿rm that is pro-
ducing only for the domestic market and is becoming either an exporter or is acquired by
a multinational company. As it was discussed earlier, the direction of causality between
the decision of a ￿rm to change status and its observed productivity is not clear. More
speci￿cally there is a simultaneity problem. Exporters might increase their productivity
because they learn from the new market (learning by exporting), but equally exporters
might need to experience an increase to their productivity before exporting to the foreign
market in order to cover the ￿xed cost of entry. Similar arguments apply for the case of
the acquisition of domestic ￿rms by MNEs. A British ￿rm that becomes the subsidiary of
a MNE could gain in terms of productivity through the superior technology and manage-
ment of the multinational. While, MNEs might target highly productive British ￿rms for
acquisition (cherry picking).
The estimation technique that is followed, multiple treatment matching, in this paper is
trying to address this simultaneity problem embedded on the research question. A simple
comparison of the productivities between ￿rms that chose di⁄erent alternatives, for example
an exporter versus a domestic producer, will su⁄er from estimation bias. The reason is
that ￿rms that chose a particular status might have certain characteristics that would have
7The multinational that desires to acquire the local ￿rm is willing to pay more than the present market
value plus discounted future pro￿ts, because it might be cheaper to serve the domestic market this way
rather than exporting.
5allowed them to experience an increase in TFP, even without a change in their status. The
simultaneity problem would have ceased to exist if there was available information about
the potential TFP of those that chose a particular status had they chosen another. For
example, the TFP growth that an exporting ￿rm would have experienced had it decided to
remain a domestic producer. This is a counterfactual and it is not possible to be observed.
But with the use of matching techniques and some assumptions it is possible to identify
these causal e⁄ects.
There are studies of Girma etal (2003) and (2004) and Wagner (2002) that estimate the
di⁄erences in TFP growth for exporters and non-exporters in UK and Germany, respec-
tively. Both studies control for the possible endogeneity problem of selection for exporters
using matching techniques. Here, I am extending this approach, allowing for an extra
"treatment", the possibility that a ￿rm is acquired by a multinational ￿rm. Hence, I fol-
low a multiple treatments approach based on the recent literature on evaluation methods,
Blundel and Costa Dias (2000) for example.
4 The Problem of Identi￿cation and the Three Causal
E⁄ects
4.1 Counterfactual and the Stable Unit Treatment Assumption
In the current setup a treatment is de￿ned as the status that a ￿rm has been through
from time t to time t+1. Hence, there are three possible treatments. Either becoming an
exporter or being acquired by a MNE or remaining a domestic producer. Let i = 1;:::;n
indicate a ￿rm, let j = DP; EX; AM denotes a treatment, where DP indicates a domestic
producer, EX an exporter and AM indicates a subsidiary of a multinational. I assume
that a ￿rm is a domestic producer, if it produces and sells its product only in the domestic
market. An exporter is de￿ned as a ￿rm that produces and sells domestically, but some of
its output is also exported. Both domestic producers and exporters are owned by British
￿rms that are not engaged in multinational activities. While a subsidiary of a MNE
produces and sells for the domestic market, but it is owned by a multinational ￿rm.
The treatments should be mutually exhaustive and exclusive. Each ￿rm can have just
one of the three statuses at one point in time. This restricts the sample, because we should
drop all ￿rms that are subsidiaries of multinationals and exporters at the same time. In
addition, only ￿rms that were domestic producers before treatment are considered8.
8The reason is that we are interested of estimating the causal e⁄ect on TFP growth of either becoming
an exporter or a subsidiary of a MNE relative to remaining a domestic producer. In order to do so we
6Let Y
j
it indicate a vector of potential outcomes on a set of performance measures, TFP,
for each ￿rm i and treatment j at time t. There are three such potential outcomes; Y DP
it ,
Y EX
it and Y AM
it . The ￿rst, Y DP
it , is the outcome that will be observed had the ith ￿rm
remained a domestic producer at time t, the second, Y EX
it , is the outcome that will be
observed if ￿rm i had become an exporter at t and ￿nally the last one, Y AM
it , is the
outcome that will be observed if ￿rm i had been acquired by a multinational company.
Before participating in any treatment, at time t ￿ 1, all these potential outcomes are
latent and are only observed had the ￿rm gone through the treatment. After participa-
tion, at time t, only one of this three potential outcomes is observed, because the ￿rm
either remained a domestic producer, or became an exporter or was acquired by a multi-
national. The rest of the potential outcomes are counterfactual and are not observed. But
using statistical techniques that require some assumptions will enable us to identify these
counterfactual and then estimate the causal e⁄ects of treatments.
The ￿rst such assumption that needs to be satis￿ed is the Stable Unit Treatment Value
assumption, Rubin (1980), which states that the potential outcomes of a ￿rm should not
be in￿ uenced by the treatment followed by other ￿rms. Let ￿it be a ternary indicator of





0, if domestic producer (DP)
1, if exporter (EX)
2, if acquired by MNE (AM)
(1)
￿it is equal to zero indicates that ￿rm i is a domestic producer at time t, when ￿it is
equal to one the ￿rm is an exporter and a value of two for ￿it indicates that the ￿rm is a
subsidiary of a MNE. Let ￿ be an n ￿ 1 vector that contains each ￿rm￿ s indicator ￿it. Y
denotes the observed outcome vector for all ￿rms and Y (￿) the potential outcome that will
prevail if all ￿rms had followed their treatment according to their indicator ￿it. Let Yi (￿)
be the potential outcome of the ith ￿rm. Assume that there are two possible treatment
allocations for every ￿rm ￿ and ￿
0 respectively. Then, the Stable Unit Treatment Value
assumption states that




if ￿i = ￿
0
i (2)
which means that the observed outcome for the ith ￿rm depends only on its treatment and
not on the treatment followed by other ￿rms. This is a strong assumption, since it rules
out any interaction between ￿rms, like spillovers and other externalities. In the presence
of such interactions, it is possible that the outcome variable might also be a⁄ected. For
exclude from the analysis ￿rms that have been either exporters or subsidiaries in the past.
7example, if there are spillovers between ￿rms then the TFP of domestic ￿rms might change
due to a change in the TFP of exporters or ￿rms that were acquired by multinationals.
But the magnitude of these kind of e⁄ects will be small as long as the participants in
the corresponding treatments are small relative to the population of the ￿rms. There are
studies in the labour market programmes evaluation literature, Blanchard and Diamond
(1989) and (1990) for example, that try to estimate the e⁄ects in the case that the Stable
Unit Treatment Value assumption is not fully satis￿ed. But such a task is not easy and
generates other di¢ culties for the estimation of the causal e⁄ects9.
4.2 The Three Causal E⁄ects and a Naive Estimator
There are three possible e⁄ects that can be estimated:







de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the outcome expected after following treatment k and the
outcome expected after following treatment l for a random ￿rm from the entire population,





l j ￿ = k
￿
(4)
is similar to the previous but with the di⁄erence that now the ￿rm is selected from the
subpopulation of the participants in treatment k, and





l j ￿ = l
￿
(5)
which is the di⁄erence in the expected outcome between the participants in treatment k
and l, for a ￿rm drawn from the subpopulation of those that participated in treatment l.
The estimate with the most interest is the Average Treatment E⁄ect on the Treated,
because it provides information about the causal e⁄ect on the outcome for those ￿rms
that have gone through a particular treatment had they decided to follow another one,
instead. For example, the Average Treatment E⁄ect on the Treated for exporters relative
to domestic producers, E
￿
Y EX ￿ Y DP j ￿ = EX
￿
, tell us what the gain or loss on TFP
exporters experienced had they chosen to remain domestic producers. On the other hand,
9For more details see Frolich (2002).
8the Average Treatment E⁄ect would have provided an estimate of the causal e⁄ect of
becoming an exporter relative to remaining domestic producer for the whole population
of ￿rms. Hence, the ATE would have included in the estimation and those ￿rms that
remained either domestic producers or were acquired by MNEs. The interest of this paper
lays on the causal e⁄ect on TFP growth for those ￿rms that became either exporters or
subsidiaries of MNEs and for that reason the ATET is the appropriate causal e⁄ect to
consider.
In order to highlight the presence of bias on the estimation if simultaneity is not taken
in consideration, we consider the case of a naive estimator as it is termed in Blundell,
Dearden and Sianesi (2004). This naive estimator involves the di⁄erence in expected



























l j ￿ = l
￿￿
where the ￿rst term on the right hand side is the the Average Treatment E⁄ect on the
Treated (ATET) and the second term is the bias10 that arises from such a naive estima-
tor. The reason is that the decisions made by ￿rms to change status are systematic and
consequently the sample of ￿rms that take a decision is not random. Failing to take this
into consideration and comparing ￿rms that took a speci￿c decision with those that they
took a di⁄erent one will result in biased estimates.
Hence, by comparing the observed outcomes of exporters and pure domestic ￿rms is
not an unbiased estimator of the causal e⁄ect of becoming an exporter, since exporters
might self-select themselves into to foreign markets. A ￿rm that is to become an exporter
might have already11 experienced an improvement in its TFP. If this is not taken into
consideration and a naive estimator is calculated then an increase in the TFP of the new
exporter might be wrongly attributed to the change of ￿rm status.
As it was discussed above the correct estimation requires information about the ex-
pected outcomes of a ￿rm had it followed both of the treatments. For example, the causal
e⁄ect on TFP growth for a ￿rm that has become an exporter would require information
about the TFP of this ￿rm had it remained a domestic producer, E
￿
Y DP j ￿ = EX
￿
. But
after treatment, only one of the potential outcomes is observed and the other is a coun-
terfactual. There are methods that try to identify this counterfactual by imposing some
structure and assumptions in the analysis and are discussed in the next section.
10Heckman and Robb (1985) and Manski (1991) had termed it selection bias.
11Before the change in its status.
95 Identi￿cation Strategies
One way to solve the identi￿cation problem of the counterfactual is usually12 to design and
implement a randomised experiment. This would mean that ￿rms are assigned randomly
into the three di⁄erent potential treatments. More formally, this would imply that the
potential outcomes, Y j, are statistically independent of the treatment ￿. Hence, in a
randomised experiment the decision to go through a particular treatment is random and
does not a⁄ect the potential outcome.
A randomised experiment ensures that any di⁄erences between ￿rms that followed dif-
ferent treatments are random and not systematic. Hence, in such a setup the observed out-
come for those that participated in treatment k has the same expected value as the potential
outcome for those that participated in programme l; E
￿










. As a consequence, under randomisation the naive estimator is applicable because
there is no any selection bias. But randomisation in the context of the choice of the status
of a ￿rm is very di¢ cult if not applicable at all.
For this reason this paper focuses on other approaches that have been suggested in order
to tackle the problem of identi￿cation. The control for confounding variables approach,
Rubin (1974), is one of them and is used here with some modi￿cations. The control for
confounding variables approach tries to reproduce the structure of a randomised experiment
by constructing comparable groups with similar features. Assume there are two ￿rms with
very similar characteristics, then their potential outcomes should be very close. If these
two ￿rms di⁄er only on the treatment that they have been through, then any di⁄erence in
their observed outcomes should be attributed to the di⁄erent treatment followed. If it is
possible to ￿nd a lot of pairs similar to this, then the causal e⁄ect of treatment k relative
to treatment l can be estimated. But for consistent estimation it is necessary that within
each pair, ￿rms have the same or very similar confounding variables X. The confounding
variables X are variables that a⁄ect the decision to participate in a treatment and also
a⁄ect the potential outcomes.
The use of the control for confounding variables approach allows the identi￿cation of
the counterfactual outcome and consequently the estimation of all the three causal e⁄ects
mentioned. But it requires that the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) for




MA ? ￿ j X (7)
(7) states that conditional on the confouding variables X, the treatment assignment in-
12Heckman and Smith (1995) discuss the potential bias that may arise in the case of random experiments.
10dicator ￿ is independent of the potential outcomes Y j, j = DP;EX;MA. This means,
that given all the confouding variables X, knowledge of the treatment followed by a ￿rm
does not provide any additional information about its potential outcome. It should be
noted as Lechner (2002) points out that the Conditional Independence Assumption is not
the minimal assumption that allows identi￿cation. The minimal assumption is conditional
mean independence, which as Lechner (2002) says, empirically usually implies CIA.
The second necessary condition for identi￿cation in the case of multiple treatments is the
common support requirement. Let Sj = fx : P (￿ = j j X = x) > 0g denote the support
of X for the participants in treatment j, where P (￿ = j j X = x) is the probability of
￿rm i with characteristics x follows treatment j. The support of X for treatment j, Sj,
de￿nes a subsample where all ￿rms with characteristics x have a positive probability of
following treatment j. The common support condition requires that for the identi￿cation
of ATET, E
￿
Y k ￿ Y l j ￿ = k
￿
, it is necessary that Sk ￿ Sl. This means that any ￿rm
with characteristics x and positive probability of following treatment k should also belong
to the support for the participants in treatment l. In other words, in order to be able to
identify the ATET, E
￿
Y k ￿ Y l j ￿ = k
￿
, those ￿rms that had treatment k and those that
had treatment l should share the same (common) support.
For the identi￿cation of ATE, E
￿
Y k ￿ Y l￿
, the common support condition requires a
stronger assumption. That is Sk = Sl = S, where S is the union of all treatment supports,
S [ Sj. This implies that the support for the population and the two sub-populations
should be the same, so that the probability for any observed ￿rm with characteristics x is
positive and very similar to the probability that any ￿rm with characteristics x is following
any of the treatments, either k or l.
Under the Conditional Independence Assumption and the common support requirement

















which states that conditional on X the observed outcome Y k for the ￿rms that have
followed treatment k has the same expected value as the potential outcome Y k for those
that followed treatment l. Consequently, all the three e⁄ects can now be identi￿ed. In
particular, by following the law of iterated expectations the Average Treatment E⁄ect can





































l j X;￿ = l
￿￿
fxdx
where fx is the population probability density function of X and both
E
￿




Y l j X;￿ = l
￿
are identi￿ed and can be estimated from the data.
Hence, the Average Treatment E⁄ect is the di⁄erence of the expected outcomes given X
of both treatment groups weighted by the population probability density function of X.




























l j X;￿ = k
￿












l j X;￿ = l
￿￿
f(xj￿=k)dx
where f(xj￿=k) is the probability density function of X among the participants in programme
k. The ￿rst part of the left hand side, E
￿
Y k j X;￿ = k
￿
, is identi￿ed and can be estimated




Y l j X;￿ = l
￿￿
f(xj￿=k)dx, needs to be estimated non-parametrically. The estima-
tion of the second part proceeds by adjusting the expected outcome of participating in
treatment l for the distribution of ￿rm characteristics X for the participants in treatment
k.




























k j X;￿ = l
￿












k j X;￿ = k
￿￿
f(xj￿=l)dx
where f(xj￿=l) is the probability density function of X among the participants in programme
l. The Average Treatment E⁄ect on the Non-Treated is the di⁄erence on the potential
outcomes between treatments k and l averaged over the probability density function of the
participants in the the lth treatment.
126 The Curse of Dimensionality and Propensity Score
Matching
The matching estimator for the ATET, E
￿
Y k ￿ Y l j X;￿ = k
￿
, tries to ￿nd for each ￿rm
that participated in treatment k at least one ￿rm that participated in treatment l with
identical or very similar confouding variables X. If many pairs like this can be found
then the causal e⁄ect on Y of following treatment k relative to l is obtained by averaging
the di⁄erence between the observed outcomes of the matched pairs. Hence, the matching
estimator needs to condition on a usually high dimensional vector of X. This creates




Y l j X;￿ = l
￿￿
f(xj￿=k)dx is non-
parametric and results on the so called curse of dimensionality. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) have shown that conditioning instead on a scalar function of X, the propensity
score13, is su¢ cient for identi￿cation in the case of a single treatment. Furthermore,
propensity score matching implies that the subsamples of the treated and non-treated
groups should have very similar distributions for variables X (Balancing Property) and
as a consequence the quality of "matching" is improved. For multiple treatments Lechner
(2001) showed that conditional independence on X implies conditional independence on
the propensity score pkjkl (x) and consequently the CIA can be re-written as:
Y
l ? ￿ j p
kjkl (x);￿ 2 fk;lg (12)
where pkjkl (x) =
pk(x)
pk(x)+pl(x) is the probability of being a participant of the kth treatment
instead of participating on treatment l and pj (x) = P (￿ = j j X) is the marginal proba-
bility of participating in treatment j given characteristics X. (12) states that conditional
on the propensity score pkjkl (x) the choice of treatment is independent of the potential
outcome Y l. So both (9), (10) and (11) can be estimated but with the di⁄erence that in
this case we need to average over the distribution of the propensity score pkjkl (x) and not
the probability density function of X. For example, in the case of ATET (10) the second












kjkl (x);￿ = l
￿














13The propensity score in the case of a single treatment is de￿nied as the probabilty of participating in
the treatment.
13where f(pkjklj￿=k) is the density of the probability to participate in treatment k instead of
participating in treatment l in the subpopulation of k.
There are several estimators that are suggested and can be summarised in the following












where nk is the number of participants in treatment k and b ￿l (x) is an estimate of the
expected outcome of participating in treatment l for those that actually participated in
l, conditional on the propensity score of the ￿rms that followed treatment k, ￿l (x) =
E
￿
Y l j pkjkl (xi);￿ = l
￿
. GME is implemented by adjusting the estimate of the conditional
expectationb ￿l (x) for the distribution of pkjkl (xi) on the subpopulation k and then averaging
b ￿l (x) for the values of pkjkl (xi).
One of the most frequently used estimator is the pair-matching estimator, Rubin (1974),
and is implemented here with some modi￿cations. It advances by ￿nding, "matching", for
every observation in the treated (target) group an observation in the non-treated (control)
group with the same or very similar propensity score. Hence, the observations from the con-
trol group that are used as "matches" are forced to follow the distribution of the propensity
score from the target group as (13) indicates. Pair-matching ￿nds only one "match", the
most similar in terms of propensity score, for every observation in the treated sub-sample.
It ignores all other observations in the control group that might have slightly more dis-
tant values of propensity score. The only exception occurs, when there are more than
one observations in the non-treated sub-sample with propensity scores that are equally
distanced from the propensity score of an observation in the treated sub-sample. In this
case, the average outcome of these non-treated observations is used for the estimation of
the counterfactual.
In the analysis of this paper I use pair-matching with replacement on the propensity
score. This implies that each observation from the control group can be used more than
once as a "match". For example, when three "matches" are allowed, the same observation
from the non-treated group can be used as a "match" for observations in the treated group
for a maximum of three times. This results to a higher variance for the estimates, but
improves the quality of matches and has been suggested as a way to eliminate any bias
that arises from non exact matching14.
The problem of bias in the case of not exact matching can also be dealt with the use of
14Abadie and Imbens, "Simple and Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average Treatment E⁄ects",
NBER, WP 283, 2002.
14bias-corrected matching estimators, see Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004). These
estimators adjust the di⁄erence on the outcomes between the "matched" observation and
the "match" by including the di⁄erence on their propensity score. Another issue regarding
the matching estimator is that usually the conditional variance of outcome j for ￿rm i












and treatments j. Here I implement estimators that take
into consideration both potential problems and correct for the possible bias from a "poor"
quality matching and also allow the conditional variance of outcome to be heteroscedastic.
Furthermore, I check whether the Balancing Property of propensity score matching is
satis￿ed by performing a formal test proposed by Smith and Todd (2005). Finally, since
the Conditional Independence Assumption does not hold in the sample I follow Lechner
(2002) and I carry out matching on a new restricted sample, in which the Conditional
Independence Assumption is imposed.
7 Data Description
The dataset that is used is primarily extracted from the OneSource database15 for the UK
from 1990 to 1996. It is an unbalanced longitudinal set that includes all public and private
limited companies that employ more than ￿fty employees. There are 110,000 companies
in total and any of them that were in the process of liquidation or dissolved have been
excluded from the sample. Due to the fact that only ￿rms with ￿fty or more employees are
included in the database, it is very likely that the sample is biased towards larger ￿rms.
But this should not create problems within the context of the analysis that is implemented.
Exporters and multinational subsidiaries are generally employing more than ￿fty employees
and matching them with domestic producers of the same size in order to form comparable
groups seems to be validated.
Additionally, OneSource contains information among other variables on employment,
physical capital, output, sales, exports, ownership status and the age of ￿rms. Although the
database provides information of foreign ownership for the latest year, this is not su¢ cient
in order to observe the time that a British ￿rm was acquired by a foreign multinational
company. For that reason, our sample was matched to a list of British subsidiaries of
foreign multinational companies that it was provided by the O¢ ce of National Statistics.
In addition, OneSource does not o⁄er any information on whether British ￿rms are acquired
by British MNEs. In order to identify these subsidiaries of domestic MNEs our sample was
once again matched with the European Linkages and International Ownership Structure
15OneSource CD-ROM, "UK companies, vol. 1", October 2000.
15(ELIOS) database16.
The analysis concentrates on the manufacturing sector only. Furthermore, any ￿rms
that had an annual employment or output growth higher than 100% are dropped from the
sample17, on the ground that such observations tend not to be reliable. In order to get the
￿nal sample I divide the original one into two years subsamples 90-91, 91-92, 92-93, 93-94,
94-95 and 95-96. Within each two years subsample, all ￿rms that are either exporters
or subsidiaries of multinationals at the earlier year are excluded. I do so because I am
interested on the causal e⁄ect of a ￿rm￿ s status change on its TFP growth. If a ￿rm has
already gone through "treatment" in the earliest time period that is observed, then it does
not provide any useful information for the analysis. For each subsample the same ￿rms
are observed in either year. All ￿rms are domestic producers in the earliest year of every
subsample and in the next year some of them switch (becoming exporters or subsidiaries
of MNEs) while others remain domestic producers.
The ￿nal sample is constructed by merging all two years subsamples and amounts to
34,752 observations. It includes information on an unbalanced panel of more than 14,113
British ￿rms in the manufacturing sector for the period from 1990 to 1996 as Table 1
shows. Firms are divided into three types: pure domestic (non-exporters), exporters and
￿rms acquired by domestic and foreign multinationals. There are between 2,441 and 3,137
￿rms each year and all of them are observed at least for two consecutive years. The earlier
partition of the sample into two years overlapping subsamples is the reason why in the ￿rst
and last year there are fewer observations than in other years as Table 1 shows.
From Table 1 it is also evident that the sample is balanced through the years with
regard to the volume of new exporters and new subsidiaries of MNEs. The highest number
of new exporters is observed in the last year 1996, when 120 British ￿rms began to export,
while the minimum was in the year before with only 94 new exporters. Similarly, 1994
was the year with the most acquisitions of British ￿rms by MNEs, 75 in total and the
year before a minimum of 41 new acquisitions took place. In total, over all the years in
the sample there were 624 new exporters and 356 new subsidiaries of MNEs in the British
manufacturing.
It is clear from Table 1 that changes in the status of ￿rms are not happening at the same
time. Hence, I treat the timing of a change in status as an "experimental time" te in order
to proceed with matching. Observations are grouped according to two "experimental"
periods. The ￿rst is "experimental" time period zero, t0
e, in which all ￿rms are domestic
producers and the second is "experimental" time period one, t1
e, where some ￿rms have
16The ELIOS database was constructed by the University of Urbino, Italy.
17I should greatly acknowledge Dr Surafel Girma for providing me with the sample of the data.
16experienced a change in their status18. Table 2 shows that there are 17,376 domestic
producers at "experimental" time period zero and in the next "experimental" time period
624 of them became exporters and 356 were acquired by MNEs. It is clear from the above
discussion about the construction of the data that all the results refer to short-time causal
e⁄ects, one year after the change of a ￿rm￿ s status.
8 Results
I perform propensity score matching allowing for replacement, bias adjustment and het-
eroscedastic variances in order to estimate the Average Treatment E⁄ect on the Treated for
three cases. These are the causal e⁄ects on TFP growth for British ￿rms of: i) becoming
exporters in relation to remaining domestic producers, ii) becoming subsidiaries of MNEs
compared with remaining domestic producers and iii) beginning to export relative to being
acquired by MNEs. This requires knowledge about each ￿rm￿ s propensity score for all the
three cases. Therefore, I estimate a Multinomial Logit model on the entire sample so as to
get estimates of the marginal probability for each ￿rm to be in one of the three statuses





0, if domestic producer
1, if exporter
2, if acquired by multinational
(15)
Assuming that the errors are independent and identically distributed across di⁄erent
statuses with a log Weibull (type I extreme value) distribution, G(uij) = exp(￿e￿uij). The
probability that status j is observed for ￿rm i given X is:






where xij includes the logarithm of lagged employment, the logarithm of lagged physical
capital and lagged age of the ￿rm. I use one year lagged values for the X variables in an
attempt to capture the sequential nature of a ￿rm￿ s decision to change status. The log of
the odds for the multinomial logit are given in Table 3. All parameters, with the exception
of the two employment coe¢ cients, are statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level. There are
30,675 observations in the estimation, because there are missing values for some of the
18This is achieved using the two years subsample discussed earler.
17lagged X variables.
The assumption about the identical and independent distribution of the errors across
statuses implies that the log of the odds for any pair of statuses does not depend on any
others. This is referred to as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption.
I test for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption using the Small-Hsiao
speci￿cation and I ￿nd that it is satis￿ed by the data as it is shown in Table 4.
The Small-Hsiao Test for the IIA proceeds as follows: First the entire sample is divided
into two random subsamples of the same size. Estimates are obtained from the two subsam-
ples. Then one of the two subsamples is chosen (unrestricted model) and all of its observa-
tions associated with a particular status are eliminated. This restricted model is estimated
again. Finally, a typical Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is calculated, with the LR statis-
tic of the form ￿2[likelihood function (restricted) ￿ likelihood function (unrestricted)]
following a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of para-
meters in the restricted model.
The null hypothesis declares that status j and status h are independent of other sta-
tuses. For example, in the ￿rst row of Table 4 the null hypothesis is that the log of the
ratio of the probability that a ￿rm is an exporter relative to the probability that it is a
domestic producer is not a⁄ected by the other available statuses. Table 4 shows that this
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at very high levels of signi￿cance. The IIA assumption
cannot be rejected for the other two cases either at the 5% level as it is evident from Table
4. This implies that a ￿rm￿ s choice between the two statuses does not depend on the avail-
ability of other statuses. Hence, the distinction between domestic producers, exporters and
subsidiaries of MNEs in the analysis also seems to be valid econometrically.
The descriptive statistics of marginal probabilities by the status of the ￿rm are presented
in Table 5. Their mean values and standard deviations are quite similar across ￿rms with
di⁄erent status. It is clear from Table 5 that the Common Support requirement is not
satis￿ed in the case of the ATET of exporting relative to remaining domestic producer.
Although the maximum value of the probability Pr(￿ = 1) for an exporter (5:72) is smaller
than the corresponding maximum value for a domestic producer (7:49), the minimum value
for exporters (0:70) is smaller than that for domestic producers (0:73). This implies that
the support for the exporters [0:70;5:72] is not a subset of the support for the domestic
producers [0:73;7:49] as the Common Support condition demands for the estimation of the
ATET. The Common Support Condition is not satis￿ed either in the case of the ATET
of beginning to export relative to becoming a subsidiary of a MNE. Again, the support of
exporters [0:70;5:72] is not a subset of the support for the subsidiaries of MNEs [0:87;4:93].
Only in the last case the of ATET of being acquired by a MNE relative to remaining a
18domestic producer the Common Support condition holds, because as it can be seen from
Table 5 the support for subsidiaries of MNEs [0:35;4:21] belongs to the support for domestic
consumers [0:18;6:28].
The fact that the Common Support is not satis￿ed by the data, suggests that the
estimate of ATET might not be accurate. The reason is that failure of the Common
Support condition indicates that for some observations in the treated group there are no
comparable observations in the control and consequently the counterfactual cannot be
identi￿ed. A possible solution is to restrict the analysis and perform matching on the
subsample of the data, where the Common Support requirement holds. In such a case the
ATET, E
￿
Y k ￿ Y l j X;￿ = k
￿
, is rede￿ned as the causal e⁄ect for only those observations
that satisfy the Common Support condition.
Following Lechner (2002), I exclude all observations with probabilities lower than the
highest value of the minimum probability across statuses. Analogously, I delete all observa-
tions with probabilities greater than the lowest value of the maximum probability between
di⁄erent statuses. This results to dropping 4,411 observations, 12.69% of the sample. This
is a quite large part of the sample, but about 99% of the observations dropped were for
domestic producers that are the most populous group in the data. The remaining 29,372
observations of domestic producers in contrast to the 33,772 in the initial sample still seem
to be a good representation of the British ￿rms serving the domestic market. This is
also evident from the very similar results produced by propensity score matching on the
Common Support and the whole sample as Table 6 and Table 7 present respectively.
Equation (13) has been estimated having as outcome variable the annual total factor
productivity growth of British ￿rms in manufacturing. TFP growth has been estimated
from a translog production function using Generalised Least Squares19. Pair-Matching
is performed on the propensity score with replacement, allowing for a maximum of four
matches for each observation on the control group. Table 6 also includes estimates that
correct for bias estimation arising from not exact matching (bias adj) and also estimates
that allow for heteroscedastic variances of statuses (robust).
From Table 6 it is evident that the ATET for exporters relative to domestic producers
in UK is positive and signi￿cant at a 5% level of signi￿cance for all numbers of matches
and variations of estimation. The smallest estimate is just above 7.79% when the number
of matches is one and the maximum is above 8.79% when the number of matches is two.
This result strongly supports the argument that domestic ￿rms that become exporters
gain in terms of productivity. In particular, ￿rms that became exporters gained on average
19I would like to thank Dr Surafel Girma for providing me with the initial data that also contained the
growth of TFP for each ￿rm.
19between 7.79 and 8.79 percentage points on their annual productivity a year after the
change in their status.
The gains for the ￿rms that were acquired by multinationals relative to domestic pro-
ducers in UK were even higher and again signi￿cant at 5% level. Firms acquired by multi-
nationals had on average experienced an increase in their productivity growth ranging from
11.55% to 13.09% relative to domestic producers a year after they became subsidiaries of
MNEs. This result veri￿es empirically the hypothesis that multinational ￿rms have a su-
perior technology compared to domestic producers in UK and are able to transfer this
technological advantage to their subsidiaries. This is observed as a higher TFP growth
for the subsidiaries of MNEs when compared with ￿rms only producing for the domestic
market.
In contrast, the ATET for exporters relative to ￿rms acquired by multinationals is
negative but signi￿cant at 6% only when one match and heteroscedastic variance are al-
lowed. For the rest of the cases the level of signi￿cance is between 7% and 10%. The 6%
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect has a coe¢ cient of -9.95% indicating that exporters have on
average a lower annual TFP growth of almost ten percentage points compared to ￿rms
that have been acquired by multinationals. The rest of the estimates present a similar
picture showing a lower productivity for exporters varying from just below 8.6% to almost
9.95%, but are signi￿cant at a 10% level.
It is clear from the above discussion and Table 6 that the number of "matches" allowed
in the estimation has an impact only on the magnitude and not the sign of the estimates
or the level of signi￿cance20. But even the changes on the magnitude of the estimates
are of a quite small size. The maximum di⁄erence was 1.54% for the ATET between
subsidiaries and domestic producers when one and two "matches" were used. Equally,
the bias-correction estimation does not alter signi￿cantly the magnitude of the estimates
compared to the basic estimation. For most cases, a change in the estimates is observed at
the seventh decimal point, while the highest di⁄erence occurred at the fourth decimal point.
This suggests that there is no problem of non exact matching and that the "quality" of the
matching is very high. Moreover, allowing for heteroscedastic variance in the estimation
reduces the standard error of the estimates, as expected, but not substantially as it seen
from Table 6.
To test the Balancing Property of the Propensity Score I perform a test proposed by
20The only exception is for the ATET between exporters and subsidiaries of MNEs when heteroscedastic
variances are allowed. When one "match" is allowed, the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant at a 6% level,
but for the rest numbers of "matches" it is signi￿cant at a 10% level.
20Smith and Todd (2005) that suggests running a regression of the following form:







￿￿ [D ￿ PSC (X)
￿] + u (17)
where xi indicates each of the X variables used to estimate the Multinomial Logit. PSC (X) =
Pr(￿=j)
Pr(￿=j)+Pr(￿=h) denotes the propensity score that status j occurs relative to status h.
D is a dummy variable taking the value of one when ￿ = j and the value of zero when
￿ = h. The null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients ￿￿ are jointly statistically insigni￿cant
implies that the balancing property of the propensity score holds. The intuition behind
the test is that, if the Balancing Property is satis￿ed then the decision to change status D
conditional on the propensity score does not a⁄ect any of the xi. In other words, the test
seeks to check whether there are di⁄erences on xi for those that have D = 0 against those
that have D = 1. The results of the Balancing Property test are presented in Table 8.
The null hypothesis that the ￿￿ coe¢ cients are jointly statistically insigni￿cant at the 5%
level is satis￿ed in 7 out of 9 cases. Hence, there seems to be evidence that the Balancing
Property holds for the great majority of the cases.
9 Conclusions
This paper has tried to asses the causal e⁄ects of a change in the status of ￿rms in terms
of potential total factor productivity gains. There is a vast literature that highlights the
possible gains for di⁄erent measures of performance, like TFP, labour productivity and
size, for ￿rms that enter foreign markets through exports. They have also highlighted
and analysed theoretically and empirically the problems of causality within this analysis,
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Clerides etal (1998) among others. There is also a growing
literature on the gains of horizontal FDI or acquisition of ￿rms by multinationals, Help-
man etal (2004) and Head and Ries (2003). The purpose of this paper is to analyse and
empirically estimate the causal e⁄ects of a change in the status of ￿rms from pure domestic
producers to either exporters or ￿rms that have been acquired by multinationals and also
the e⁄ect of becoming an exporter relative to a subsidiary of a MNE.
There are simultaneity problems that have been highlighted in the literature of evalua-
tion methods that is mainly concern about the e⁄ectiveness of labour market programmes,
Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) for example. Motivated by this literature and also
by some new research on applied international trade that employed these techniques in the
case of a single treatment, Girma etal (2004) and Wagner (2002), I have tried to analyse
21the e⁄ects described above within the context of multiple treatments methods and this is
the most signi￿cant novelty of the paper. Multiple treatment matching methods are able
to identify the countrerfactual and consequently estimate causal e⁄ects.
The matching technique in the case of multiple treatments has been used having as
di⁄erent treatments three possible statuses for a ￿rm. These are: i) domestic producer, ii)
exporter and iii) subsidiary of a multinational company. Pair-matching on the propensity
score with replacement was implemented, allowing for a maximum of four "matches" for
each observation in the target group for the estimation of each ATET. The marginal prob-
abilities on being in any of these three possible statuses were estimated by a Multinomial
Logit model, where the variables X a⁄ecting each of the decisions were lagged employment,
lagged physical capital and lagged age of the ￿rm. Descriptive statistics of the resulting
estimates for the marginal probabilities by status are presented in Table 5, from where it
is clear that the probability of being a domestic producer is by far the higher re￿ ecting the
big number of pure domestic ￿rms in our sample.
The estimated ATETs presented in Table 6 are for the sample that it is restricted
to satisfy the Common Support condition. It shows that the short-term TFP gains for
exporters relative to domestic producers are between 7.79% and 8.79% depending on the
number of matches allowed and are all signi￿cant at a 5 % level of signi￿cance. Identical
in sign and again statistically signi￿cant at a 5% level, but higher in magnitude are the
gains experienced by subsidiaries of multinationals relative to domestic producers, one year
after the acquisition. On average ￿rms that were acquired by MNEs had a higher annual
productivity growth between 11.55% to 13.09% relative to domestic producers. Finally,
the di⁄erence in TFP growth, one year after the change in status, between exporters and
￿rms that were acquired by MNEs was negative for all the number of matches. But only
one was signi￿cant at the 6% level with a value of 9.94%. The rest of the estimates were
ranging between 8.58% and 9.49% less productivity for exporters, but only signi￿cant at
the 10% level.
Concluding, it can be said that new exporters experience higher TFP growth, between
7.79% to 8.79% a year after beginning to export, with respect to domestic producers.
Productivity gains were also experienced for ￿rms acquired by multinationals relative to
domestic producers ranging from 11.55% to 13.09%, after controlling for the likely prob-
lems of simultaneity in our analysis.. In both of these case all the e⁄ects estimated were
statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The last case, which assessed the di⁄erence in TFP
between exporters and ￿rms that were acquired by MNEs had only one signi￿cant estimate
at 6% level. This suggests that exporters have a lower annual TFP growth compared to
￿rms acquired by MNEs by around 9.95 percentage points, but this result is less robust.
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25Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Of Sample
all years
Treatment (Status)
year pure domestic exporters MNE acquired Total
1990 2,441 0 0 2,441
1991 4,976 115 58 5,149
1992 5,348 102 67 5,517
1993 5,658 98 41 5,797
1994 5,985 95 75 6,155
1995 6,273 94 63 6,430
1996 3,091 120 52 1,677
Total 33,772 624 356 34,752





pure domestic exporters MNE acquired Total
0 17,376 0 0 17,376
1 16,396 624 356 17,376
Total 33,772 624 356 34,752
Table 3: Multinomial Logit
Log of the Odds
coef std error p-value
Pr(￿i=0)
Pr(￿i=2) age 0.007 0.002 0.004
log employment 0.010 0.063 0.869
log capital -0.213 0.049 0.000
constant 6.706 0.378 0.000
Pr(￿i=1)
Pr(￿i=2) age 0.020 0.003 0.000
log employment -0.063 0.079 0.429
log capital -0.249 0.060 0.000
constant 3.269 0.466 0.000
Observations 30675 LR test of joint signi￿cance
Log likelihood -4922 ￿2 (p-value) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0118
26Table 4: Small-Hsiao Test For The IIA Assumption
Ho: outcome j vs outcome h are independent of others
Outcome j Outcome h ￿2 p-value Evidence
1 0 0.947 0.918 Ho true
1 2 8.416 0.077 Ho true
0 2 2.811 0.590 Ho true
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics Of Marginal






mean 96.80 96.70 96.80
std. dev 0.005 0.006 0.005
min 92.17 92.89 94.22
max 97.83 97.57 97.57
Pr(￿i = 1)
mean 2.03 2.22 1.86
std. dev 0.006 0.007 0.005
min 0.73 0.70 0.87
max 7.49 5.72 4.93
Pr(￿i = 2)
mean 1.16 1.06 1.33
std. dev 0.004 0.004 0.004
min 0.18 0.30 0.35
max 6.28 6.40 4.21
Observations (29695) (624) (356)
27Table 6: Causal Effects On TFP Growth (%)
common support; standard error x 100 in parenthesis
ATET number of matches
one two three four bias
adj.
robust
exporter vs 7.79590￿￿￿ 8.79102￿￿￿ 8.22852￿￿￿ 8.00229￿￿￿ no no
domestic (3:099) (2:947) (2:774) (2:700)
producer 7.79584￿￿￿ 8.79101￿￿￿ 8.22856￿￿￿ 8.00227￿￿￿ yes no
(3:0:99) (2:947) (2:774) (2:700)
7.79590￿￿￿ 8.79102￿￿￿ 8.22852￿￿￿ 8.00229￿￿￿ no yes
(2:711) (2:815) (2:728) (2:675)
subsidiary 11.55923￿￿￿ 13.09936￿￿￿ 12.18942￿￿￿ 12.46378￿￿￿ no no
of MNE vs (3:926) (3:713) (3:550) (3:441)
domestic 11.55941￿￿￿ 13.09964￿￿￿ 12.18955￿￿￿ 12.46364￿￿￿ yes no
producers (3:926) (3:712) (3:550) (3:441)
11.55923￿￿￿ 13.09936￿￿￿ 12.18942￿￿￿ 12.46378￿￿￿ no yes
(3:461) (3:564) (3:439) (3:330)
exporter vs -9.95368￿ -8.58146￿ -9.49664￿ -8.93627￿ no no
subsidiary (5:840) (5:283) (5:154) (5:057)
of MNE -9.94769￿ -8.58231￿ -9.49665￿ -8.93506￿ yes no
(5:840) (5:283) (5:154) (5:057)
-9.95368￿￿ -8.58146￿ -9.49664￿ -8.93627￿ no yes
(5:116) (5:053) (5:211) (5:161)
￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿ and ￿ indicate 1%, 6% and 10% level of signi￿cance, respectively
28Table 7: Causal Effects On TFP Growth (%)
whole sample; standard error x 100 in parenthesis
ATET number of matches
one two three four bias
adj.
robust
exporter vs 7.77871￿￿￿ 8.57184￿￿￿ 8.05816￿￿￿ 8.04524￿￿￿ no no
domestic (3:066) (2:907) (2:739) (2:671)
producer 7.77850￿￿￿ 8.57184￿￿￿ 8.05822￿￿￿ 8.04535￿￿￿ yes no
(3:066) (2:907) (2:739) (2:671)
7.77871￿￿￿ 8.57184￿￿￿ 8.05816￿￿￿ 8.04524￿￿￿ no yes
(2:685) (2:793) (2:705) (2:652)
subsidiary 11.31803￿￿￿ 12.87603￿￿￿ 11.89894￿￿￿ 12.54700￿￿￿ no no
of MNE vs (3:924) (3:714) (3:535) (3:418)
domestic 11.31754￿￿￿ 12.87727￿￿￿ 11.89982￿￿￿ 12.54666￿￿￿ yes no
producers (3:924) (3:714) (3:535) (3:418)
11.31803￿￿￿ 12.87603￿￿￿ 11.89894￿￿￿ 12.54700￿￿￿ no yes
(3:451) (3:524) (3:419) (3:317)
exporter vs -9.96814￿ -8.30246￿ -9.55183￿ -9.38215￿ no no
subsidiary (5:806) (5:218) (5:098) (5:011)
of MNE -9.97213￿ -8.30713￿ -9.55408￿ -9.38403￿ yes no
(5:806) (5:218) (5:099) (5:011)
-9.96814￿￿￿ -8.30246￿ -9.55183￿ -9.38215￿ no yes
(5:073) (4:970) (5:125) (5:048)
￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿ and ￿ indicate 1%, 5% and 11% level of signi￿cance, respectively
Table 8: Balancing Property Test
H0 : ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = ￿4 = 0
yx
Propensity Score age employment capital
Pr(￿i=1)
Pr(￿i=1)+Pr(￿i=0) reject H0 reject H0 accept H0
(0:026) (0:032) (0:072)
Pr(￿i=1)
Pr(￿i=1)+Pr(￿i=2) accept H0 accept H0 accept H0
(0:363) (0:437) (0:405)
Pr(￿i=2)
Pr(￿i=2)+Pr(￿i=0) accept H0 accept H0 accept H0
(0:494) (0:447) (0:529)
p-values in parenthesis
29